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COMMENTS

THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF SECURED CREDITORS
UNDER CHAPTER XIII OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
INTRODUCTION

The two forms of relief for financially distressed wage
earners under the current Federal Bankruptcy Act are straight

bankruptcy' and a Wage Earner Plan as provided for under Chapter XIII.2 Prior to 1938 only straight bankruptcy was available
to the insolvent debtor seeking relief from his creditors. This

procedure was recognizably traumatic for the debtor who was
discharged from his debts only by surrendering his assets and

being stigmatized as a bankrupt.3 Moreover, straight bankruptcy
was generally an unsatisfactory solution for the creditors, who
4
seldom received more than a fraction of their claims.

Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act was adopted to ame-

liorate the harsh results and unsatisfactory solutions of straight
bankruptcy. 5

Through a Wage Earner Plan, a debtor is per-

mitted to resolve his financial problems with a judicially ap-

proved and supervised plan providing for periodic payments to
1. Bankruptcy Act Chapter I-VII, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-74 (1973).
[Hereinafter all citations will be to the Bankruptcy Act only.]
2. Bankruptcy Act §§ 601-86 (1973).
3. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966); see also Note,
The Wage Earner Plan-A Superior Alternative to Straight Bankruptcy,
9 UTAH L. Rsv. 730 (1965); Allgood, Operation of the Wage Earners'
Plan in the Northern District of Alabama, 14 RuTcGEs L. R.v. 578 (1960).
4. See note 3 supra.
5. H. R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-55 (1937). Congress
has reaffirmed its legislative purpose in amendments to Chapter XIII
adopted since the original enactment. A report to the House of Representatives stated:
[C]hapter XIII provides a highly desirable method for dealing with
the financial difficulties of individuals. It creates an equitable
and feasible way for the honest and conscientious debtor to pay off
his debts rather than having them discharged in bankruptcy. The
power of the court to change the amount and maturity of installment payments without affecting the aggregate amount of such payments makes Chapter XIII particularly applicable to the presentday financial problems generated by heavy installment buying.
H.R. REP. No. 193, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959).
The Senate report agreed:
We think there can be no doubt . . . that a procedure by which a
debtor who is financially involved and unable to meet his debts as
they mature, over a period of time, works out of his involvement
and pays his debts in full is good for his creditors and good for him.
S. REP. No. 179, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959), 1959 U.S. Code Cong. and
Admin. News, 1446, 1447.
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creditors out of future earnings." The plan may provide for an
extension or composition of the debtor's outstanding obligations
to achieve the desired relief. 7 If the plan is successfully completed, creditors receive full payment or some approximation of
full payment, while the debtor retains his assets, his good name
and hopefully is rehabilitated in his spending habits.
A debtor filing a Wage Earner Plan under Chapter XIII must
submit a verified petition stating that he is insolvent or unable
to meet his obligations as they become due." He must also prepare a plan which provides for the extension or composition of
his debtsY The plan must deal with all unsecured claims generally'0 and may deal with secured claims severally,1 ' except
6. In noting this characteristic, one writer pointed out:
Interestingly enough, the wage earner plans of Chapter XIII are
one of the few presently available methods envisioning the payment
of past obligations via promises to pay out of future earnings (often
the basic assumption behind the original creation of the debt).
Comment, Debtors' Dilemma: Status of the Secured Creditor Under
Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U.C.D.L. REv. 277, 278 (1971)
(footnotes omitted).
7. Bankruptcy Act § 623 (1973). Section 623 states:
A petition filed under this chapter shall state that . . . [the debtor]
desires to effect a composition or an extension, or both, out of his
future earnings or wages.
An extension permits a debtor to extend the time period for payment,
but requires that the debts be paid in full. The extended time period is
ordinarily not more than three years. On the other hand, a composition
of debts reduces the payments made to less than 100% on each debt
owed. Most wage earner plans are extension plans. In the Northern
District of Illinois, for example, 98% of all wage earner plans filed in
1974 were extension plans. This figure was compiled from, United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Annual Report
(1974).
8. Bankruptcy Act § 623 (1973). An insolvent debtor is a person
whose debts exceed the total value of his assets. Bankruptcy Act §
1(19) (1973). Chapter XIII, however, is available to both debtors who
are insolvent and to those who allege that they are unable to pay their
debts as they mature. Inability to pay debts as they mature does not
necessarily mean that one is insolvent. A debtor in Chapter XIII may
have assets the value of which greatly exceeds the amount owed. In
such situations straight bankruptcy is not practical. The debtor will be
in a much better position if he voluntarily disposes of some assets to
pay creditors rather than go through the embarrassment of bankruptcy.
9. See note 7 supra. The procedural aspects of Chapter XIII are
governed by the Chapter XIII Rules of Procedure adopted in 1973. Rule
13-201 states:
If a plan is not filed with the petition it shall be filed within 10
days thereafter and such time shall not be further extended except
for cause shown ....
[Hereinafter the Chapter XIII Rules shall be cited by number only.]
These rules were approved by the Judicial Conference of the United
States and were prescribed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075, to govern the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, motions and the practice and procedure under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act. These rules supersede laws, including provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, in conflict with
them. However, like other rules of court authorized to be prescribed
by the Supreme Court under the enabling provisions of Chapter 131 of
the Judicial Code, they "shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right" set forth in the Bankruptcy Act.
10. Bankruptcy Act § 646(1) (1973): "A plan under this chapter-
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those which are secured by real property. 12 Notice of the proposed plan with the date for the first meeting of creditors is then
sent to all known claimants of the debtor. 13 At the first meeting the court allows or disallows the creditors' claims,' 4 and
determines which claims are secured, 15 partially secured16 or
(1) shall include provisions dealing with unsecured debts generally,
upon any terms."
11. Id. § 646(2): "A plan under this chapter-(2) may include provisions dealing with secured claims severally, upon any terms."
12. Id. § 606(1). This section provides that "claims" secured by
real estate shall not be included in the definition of "claims" recognizable
under Chapter XIII. Further, the term "creditor" shall mean the holder
of any claim. Id. § 606(2).
13. Rule 13-204(a) (1) provides:
(a) First Meeting.
(1) Date and Place. Promptly after the filing of a plan the
court shall call a first meeting of creditors, but if there is an application or motion to dismiss or to convert to bankruptcy under Rule
13-112, or an appeal from or a motion to vacate an order entered
under that rule, the court may delay fixing a date for such meeting. A copy or summary of the last filed plan and a form of proof
of claim containing provision for acceptance or rejection of the plan
shall accompany the notice of the meeting. The notice shall state
that any secured claim not filed on or before the first date set for
the first meeting of creditors or within such extended time as the
court may fix will not be treated as a secured claim for purposes
of voting and distribution and that any creditor filing a claim who
has not filed a written acceptance or rejection of the plan pursuant
to Rule 13-202 prior to the conclusion of the first meeting of
creditors shall be deemed to have accepted the plan. The meeting
may be held at a regular place for holding court or at any other
place within the district more convenient for the parties in interest.
14. Rule 13-204 (a) (2) provides:
(2) Agenda. The bankruptcy judge shall preside over the
transaction of all business at the first meeting of creditors, including the examination of the debtor. He shall, when necessary, allow
and disallow claims, determine which claims are unsecured and
which are secured and to what extent, which claims have voted for
and against acceptance of the plan, and may rule on confirmation
of the plan pursuant to Rule 13-213 if notice of the hearing on confirmation was included in the notice of the meeting.
The creditor sets out his claim by filing a Proof of Claim with the
court. Rule 13-301 states:
(a) Form and Content; Who May Execute. A proof of claim
shall consist of a statement in writing setting forth a creditor's
claim and setting forth facts showing that such claim is free from
any charge forbidden by applicable law. Except as provided in
Rules 13-303 and 13-304, a proof of claim shall be executed by the
creditor or by his duly authorized agent. Except as provided in
Rule 13-303, a proof of claim shall conform substantially to Official Form No. 13-9.
(b) Evidentiary Effect. A proof of claim executed and filed
in accordance with these rules shall constitute prima facie evidence
of the validity and amount of the claim, but any creditor may be
required by the court to establish by affidavit or in such other
manner as the court may require before allowance of the claim,
that it is free from any charge forbidden by applicable law.
15. Rule 13-302(c): "If a security interest is claimed, the proof of
claini shall be accompanied by satisfactory evidence that the security
interest has been perfected." Further, Rule 13-302(e) (1) provides:
A secured claim, whether or not listed in the Chapter XIII Statement, must be filed on or before the first date set for the first
meeting of creditors in the Chapter XIII case unless the court, on
application before the expiration of that time and for cause shown,
shall grant a reasonable, fixed extension of time. Any claim not
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unsecured 17 for purposes of the Chapter XIII proceeding. Once
the status of creditors has been determined, a vote is taken for
or against acceptance of the plan.' If accepted by all creditors,
the plan will usually be confirmed by the court,1" at which time
it becomes binding upon the parties. 20 However, if less than
all creditors accept the plan, it can only be confirmed by the
court if a majority of the unsecured creditors who are "affected"
property filed by the creditor within such time shall not be treated
as a secured claim for purposes of voting and distribution in the
ChapterXIII case. (Emphasis added).

16. Rule 13-307 (d) requires the valuation of security:

(d) Secured Claims. If a secured creditor files a claim, the value
of the security interest held by him as collateral for his claim shall
be determined by the court. The claim shall be allowed as a
secured claim to the extent of the value so determined and as an
unsecured claim to the extent it is enforceable for any excess of
the claim over such value. For the purposes of this subdivision
the court may appoint an appraiser in the manner specified by and
subject to the limitations of Bankruptcy 'Rule 606.
The importance of this section will be explored in detail later. See notes
63-77 and accompanying text, infra.
17. Rule 13-302(e) (2):
(2) Unsecured Claims. Unsecured claims, whether or not listed
in the Chapter XIII Statement, must be filed within 6 months after
the first date set for the first meeting of creditors in the Chapter
XIII case, except as follows:
(A) On application before the expiration of such period
and for cause shown, the court may grant a reasonable, fixed
extension of time for the filing of a claim by the United States,
a state, or a subdivision thereof.
(B) In the interest of justice the court may grant an infant
or incompetent person without a guardian up to an additional
6 months for filing a claim.
(C) A claim which arises in favor of a person or becomes
allowable because of a judgment for the recovery of money or
property from such person or because of a judgment denying or
avoiding a person's interest in property may be filed within 30
days after such judgment becomes final, but if the judgment
imposes a liability which is not satisfied, or a duty which is
not performed, within such period or such further time as the
court may permit, the claim shall not be allowed.
18. Rule 13-202. Generally, if a creditor does not file a written
rejection prior to the conclusion of the first meeting of creditors, he
shall be deemed to have accepted the plan.
19. Bankruptcy Act § 651 (1973) provides:
A plan which at the meeting of creditors, as provided in section 633
of this Act, has been accepted in writing by all creditors affected
thereby, whether or not their claims have been proved, shall be
confirmed by the court whern the debtor shall have made the
deposit required under this chapter and under the plan, and if the
court is satisfied that the plan and its acceptance are in good faith
and have not been made or procured by any means, promises or
acts forbidden by this Act.
Section 651 has been revised by Rule 13-213 which requires a hearing
prior to confirmation even though all affected creditors have accepted
the plan.
20. Bankruptcy Act § 657 (1973):
Upon confirmation of a plan, the plan and its provisions shall be
binding upon the debtor and upon. all creditors of the debtor,
whether or not they are affected by the plan or have accepted it
or have filed their claims, and whether or not their claims have
been scheduled or allowed or are allowable.
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by the plan approve it, and if21 every secured creditor whose claim
is "dealt with" also consents.
Problems with approval of a Chapter XIII plan arise when
a secured creditor refuses to consent to confirmation. The court
must then determine whether the creditor has been "dealt with"
by the proposed plan. The "dealt with" clause has been construed
by the judiciary in a variety of ways, and the manner in which
the phrase is interpreted often determines the rights, status and
power of the non-assenting secured creditor. 22 Since secured
creditors are usually present in contemporary Chapter XIII proceedings, 23 the manner in which the courts construe their rights
and powers often determines whether a plan will 'succeed or fail
and ultimately whether the Chapter will fulfill its purpose of
24
providing an alternative to straight bankruptcy.
Cases considering the issue of the proper role of the nonassenting secured creditor and whether he has been "dealt with"
by a plan have left a mass of conflicting opinions. Some decisions result in secured creditors having virtually unlimited control over the confirmation of a debtor's plan, while others have
attempted to arrive at equitable results by invoking their power
to enjoin non-assenting creditors from foreclosing on their
security, apparently ignoring the "dealt with" clause of Chapter
XIII. Further, decisions are found which juggle the statutory
21. Id. § 652:

If a plan has not been so accepted, an application for the confirmation of the plan may be filed with the court within such time
as the court shall have fixed in the notice of such meeting, or at
or after such meeting and after, but not before(1) it has been accepted in writing, if unsecured creditors are
affected by the plan, by a majority in number of all such creditors
whose claims have been proved and allowed before the conclusion
of the meeting, which number shall represent a majority in amount
of such claims, and by the secured creditors whose claims are dealt
with by the plan; and
(2) the debtor has made the deposit of moneys required of him
under this chapter and under the plan.
Rule 13-213 revises § 652 by eliminating the requirement of a formal
application for confirmation.
22. Some courts have effectively limited whatever power the nonassenting secured creditor may have by enjoining such creditors from
acting. See note 57 and accompanying text, infra.
The use of the court's injunctive power may today be a more important judicial weapon in limiting non-assenting secured creditors'
powers than any interpretation of the "dealt with" clause. With the
adoption in 1973 of the Chapter XIII Rules of Procedure, the filing of a
Chapter XIII petition operates as an automatic stay of actions and lien
enforcement by creditors against the debtor. Rule 13-401(a).
The
courts thus have the power to prevent reclamation of security by merely
refusing to lift the pre-existing injunction. Prior to the adoption of
the Rules, the courts had the power to issue injunctions only for cause
(Bankruptcy Act § 614) and this may have limited courts from using
it in the past.
23. See Seidman, The Plight of the Secured Creditors in Chapter XI,
80 CoM. L.J. 343, 344 (1975).
24. It must be noted that there are few appeals from any decision
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provisions and language to arrive at results deemed just by the
courts.
What remains is confusion. Nowhere is there an authoritative pronouncement of the legal and equitable rights of secured
creditors in Chapter XIII proceedings. The source of this confusion is found in the imprecise language of Chapter XIII, which
has been referred to as the most poorly drafted section of the
Bankruptcy Act.25 At this point, a review of the cases interpreting the ambiguous language of Chapter XIII, and how such
interpretations affect the administration of the Chapter, is
necessary in order to determine the proper status of secured
creditors with respect to Wage Earner Plans.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECURED CREDITORS
UNDER CHAPTER XIII

The cases concerning Chapter XIII secured creditors deal
mainly with two issues: whether a plan can be confirmed over
the objection of a secured creditor, and, if confirmed, whether
the court can enjoin the creditor from reclaiming his security.
These issues are often so interconnected in the cases as to make
separate discussion impractical. However, since a plan cannot
be confirmed if not accepted by every creditor secured by an
interest in personal property whose claim is "dealt with, '26 the
initial question is whether the non-assenting secured creditor has
in fact been "dealt with" by the proposed plan. Several views
have evolved concerning this issue. The ultimate effect of the
view adopted by a particular court is often determinative of
whether Chapter XIII will be a viable alternative to straight
bankruptcy.
One line of decisions has virtually foreclosed a debtor from
taking advantage of Chapter XIII when non-assenting secured
creditors are present. These decisions hold that a secured creditor is "dealt with" if his contract rights are in any way changed
or if his claim is ignored. In the case of In re O'Dell,27 the
of the Chapter XIII court. The amount of any secured or unsecured
claim is generally small when compared with the potential costs of an
appeal. Therefore, both debtors and creditors find it advantageous to
arrive at some equitable settlement rather than press their legal rights.
The "proper" role of the secured creditor in Chapter XIII cases must
be viewed with this general principle in mind.
The potential problem which exists, however, is that the various
jurisdictions may well be following the scant case law which has evolved
in their districts. If this is so, then the "law" on secured creditors' rights

in Chapter XIII depends on where one lives and necessarily denotes the
bargaining power which the parties have. This problem should be

alleviated by congressional action. See p. 394-95 infra.
25. Countryman, New Rules for Chapter XIII, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J.

129 (1972).

26. Bankruptcy Act § 652 (1973).

27. 198 F. Supp. 389 (D.Kan. 1961).
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debtor proposed a plan which provided for payment of $37 per
week to secured creditors whose contracts called for payments
of $38 per week. The referee confirmed the plan, but on appeal
it was held that confirmation should have been denied on the
grounds that a wage earner plan must provide for full payment
to all secured creditors according to the terms of their contracts
before a plan could be confirmed. 28 By way of dictum the court
announced that even if a debtor expressly excluded a secured
creditor from the actual terms of a plan, the creditor would nonetheless be deemed "dealt with. '29 In short, this holding stands
for the position that all secured creditors must either accept a
plan, be fully provided for, or be allowed to reclaim their
collateral as a prerequisite to confirmation.
The O'Dell court in the later case of In re Copes,30 was faced
with a plan which provided for payments of $27 per month in lieu
of $45 per month as required by the secured creditor's contract.-'
The Copes court reaffirmed its earlier position notwithstanding
the trial court's finding that reclamation of the collateral would
interfere with the plan's success. The court held that "a secured
creditor who rejects a plan is entitled either to his contract benefits or the return of his security. '3 2 Apparently, the creditor's
contract rights were deemed more important than the otherwise
viable Chapter XIII plan.
The reasoning in O'Dell was carried to its logical conclusion
by an Ohio district court in In re Pappas.33 In Pappas, a partially secured creditor 3 4 appealed from the referee's order con28. Id. at 391. The court stated:
A plan . . .which does not provide for assumption of executory
contracts by the trustee or otherwise make provision for the payment of the claims of secured creditors according to the terms of the
instrument creating the debt, does deal with such claims. A plan
without such provisions should not be confirmed unless accepted
by the secured creditors.
29. The court reasoned that dissenting secured creditors would have
been subject to the potential injunctive power of the bankruptcy court
and thus could have been prevented from enforcing their secured liens.
In disagreeing with this logic, one court noted that:
What the [O'Dell] court was saying was that because a general pro-

vision in the Act might empower the referee to prevent such
recourse, 'realistically' the claim was dealt with in the plan. Not
only did this produce the unfortunate, and we believe unnecessary,
holding that no plan can be confirmed over the objection of a
secured creditor who is not fully recognized in his pursuit of income
as well as against the security, but it did so by the paradoxical

reasoning that a claim was 'dealt with by a plan' precisely because
it was not dealt with.

Cheetham v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 390 F.2d 234, 238 n.5 (1st

Cir. 1968). The potential injunctive power which the O'Dell court
feared is today automatic. See note 22 supra.
30. 206 F. Supp. 329 (D. Kan. 1962).

31. Id.
32. Id. at 331.

33. 216 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ohio 1962).

34. The fact that the creditor was partially secured would have
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firming the debtor's plan. The order had specifically stated that
the particular creditor was not to be dealt with by the plan.35
Further, the referee granted the creditor leave to file a reclamation petition, and in the interim provided that "said creditor shall
participate as a secured creditor . . . in the funds paid by the

debtor into the plan until a determination on the reclamation
proceedings.

'36

On appeal, the district court concluded that the

creditor was forced to become an involuntary participant because
the periodic payments under the plan would have been insufficient to meet the full monthly installments called for in the
contractual agreement. 37 Acceptance of the plan by the secured
creditor was held a prerequisite to confirmation because the
lesser periodic payments were deemed to constitute a modification of the creditor's contract rights.38 The creditor was thus
"dealt with," and since he had not accepted the plan, the order
of confirmation was reversed.
The approach taken in the O'Dell line of cases has severely
restricted the use of the wage earner plan. By requiring that
all secured creditors assent to a plan as a condition of confirmation, or that any dissenters be allowed to enforce their security
interests and reclaim their collateral, such creditors were placed
in a strong bargaining position. In effect, they could veto any
plan that did not guarantee the identical rights they enjoyed
prior to the debtor seeking relief in a Wage Earner Plan.39

All other courts having considered the issue have rejected
the O'Dell conclusion that a creditor excluded from a plan may
have a say in the confirmation. 40 The principal effect of this
reasoning is to permit confirmation of plans which have excluded
dissenting secured creditors from their operation. This approach
gives substance to the permissive language of Section 646 of the
Act which states that a plan "may include provisions dealing
profoundly influenced the outcome of this case had the Chapter XIII
Rules been in effect at the time of decision. See notes 63-77 and accompanying text, infra.
35. In re Pappas, 216 F. Supp. 819, 821 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 822.
38. Id.

39. The following courts have followed this position: Terry v.
Colonial Stores 'Employee's Credit Union, 411 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1969);
Interstate Finance Corp. v. Scrogham, 265 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1959); In re
Rutledge, 277 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Ark 1967); In re Pappas, 216 F. Supp.
819 (S.D. Ohio 1962); In re O'Dell, 198 F. Supp. 389 (D. Kan. 1961).
See also 63 MIcH. L. Rzv. 1449 (1965).

40. See, e.g., Cheetham v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 390 F.2d 234

(1st Cir. 1968); In re Clevenger, 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960).

See

generally Poulos, The Secured Creditor in Wage Earner Proceedings:

Dream Versus Reality, 44 REF. J. 68 (1970); Comment, Debtors'
Dilemma: Status of the Secured Creditor Under Chapter XIII of the

Bankruptcy Act, 4 U.C.D.L. REV. 277 (1971).
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with secured debts .... ",41 and represents a more reasonable
construction of the Chapter XIII language. Although these
courts are in agreement on the proposition that only secured
creditors named in the plan may object to confirmation, they
differ as to whether such creditors have been "dealt with." One
line of decisions requires named secured creditors to receive full
contractual payments, while the other permits slight modification of their contract rights.
The courts which follow the first line of reasoning have consistently held that secured creditors are "dealt with" whenever
a plan proposes to modify contractual rights. Modification of
contract rights includes both changes in rates of payment 42 and
failure to provide for the payment of arrears within specific time
periods. 4 The practical effect of these decisions is to permit
referees to confirm plans over the objection of secured creditors
who have been fully provided for. Moreover, if the creditor has
been excluded from the proposed plan, the referee can invoke
his injunctive power and stay reclamation proceedings upon making certain findings. Generally, the court must find that the
debtor has an equity in the property or that it is necessary to
his performance under the plan, that the creditor's security is
not impaired by the stay, and that the stay is conditioned upon
appropriate provisions in the plan for 44curing defaults and maintaining payments on the secured claim.
Although this line of cases is more consistent with the congressional intent"5 than the O'Dell line, it is not without problems. These problems can best be illustrated by an example
founded upon current economic realities. Assume that D, a wage
earner, is employed at a net salary of $450 per month, and that
his expenses for food, rent and clothing are $300 per month. D
owes $800 on a debt secured by his automobile, payable to creditor C in monthly installments of $80. D uses the automobile
to drive to and from work. D also has other unsecured debts
aggregating $1,200, which require payment of $50 per month. His
41.
42.
ham v.
43.

Bankruptcy Act § 646 (1973) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., In re Clevenger, 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960); cf. CheetUniversal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 390 F.2d 234, 238 n.6 (1st Cir. 1968).
See, e.g., In re Rutledge, 277 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Ark. 1967).

44. Id. The injunctive power may also be exercised by the court in

Chapter XIII proceedings to stay foreclosure of claims secured by in-

terests in real property if the same factors are present.

Thus, even

though § 606(1), (4) and § 646(2) forbid a plan from dealing with
claims secured by real property, it has been recognized that the term
"property" as used in both § 611 and § 614 includes such interests, and

therefore the court has the power to stay foreclosures of liens on real
property. Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th

Cir. 1963); In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ala. 1962); In re
Howard, 344 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
45. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
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total secured and unsecured obligations therefore are $130 per
month. Assume further that D loses his job and finds new employment one month later at $350 per month net. D is now in
arrears on his obligations and files a petition invoking the statutory provisions of Chapter XIII and alleges his inability to meet
present outstanding obligations. D determines that he can cut
his necessary living expenses to $280 per month and his plan proposes to pay $70 per month on his $130 per month obligations.
The plan is to terminate in 29 months, when D's total debt burden
of $2,000 is completely satisfied. If the court requires full contract payment in the plan as a prerequisite to confirmation, or full
payment outside the plan prior to enjoining reclamation, D will
lose the vehicle unless C assents to reduced payments. Since
the car is necessary for D's transportation to and from work,
the entire plan will fail for he will be unable to earn the funds
necessary to implement it.
The other problem presented by the example concerns
arrears. The "no modification" line of cases would require
arrears to be paid within a specific, reasonable time. However,
this requirement will generally compel the payment of both the
arrears and the entire balance due, since most4 contracts call for
an acceleration of the amount due upon default. "
When the "no modification" position is viewed in the light
of the practical problems inherent in its operation, it realistically
offers little more than O'Dell. Under both lines of reasoning
the debtor must maintain his contract payments to secured
47
creditors or permit reclamation of the collateral.
Both the O'Dell and the "no modification" positions preclude
debtors from extending the period of payment to secured creditors. However, as Congress noted, the key to the Wage Earner
Plan is the power of the courts to "change the amount and
maturity of installment payments without affecting the aggregate amount [owed] . . . . 48 It therefore appears that Congress
contemplated permitting debtors to extend the payment clauses
in their contracts with all creditors, so long as, in the case of
secured creditors, the amount owed to the value of the security is
guaranteed, and the collateral is not impaired.
46. In reference to the problem, one bankruptcy referee has stated
that "[a]ny notion about making up arrearages accruing prior to the
commencement of the Chapter XIII proceeding . . . should be dismissed
as being purely utopian." Poulos, The Secured Creditorin Wage Earner
Proceedings: Dream Versus Reality, 44 REp. J. 68 (1970).
47. It has been suggested that the effect of the no modification
approach is merely to postpone the secured creditor's ability to destroy
the plan. Comment, Bankruptcy: Enforcing a Chapter XIII Wage
Earner's Plan Over the Objection of a Secured Creditor, 6 SAN DITEo
L.REv. 69, 75 (1969).
48. H.R.REP. No. 193, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959).
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To date, however, the "no modification" position has not been
tested in connection with the new Chapter XIII Rules of Procedure which were adopted in 1973.49 The Rules now provide
for an automatic stay of lien enforcement, which may be lifted
for cause in the discretion of the court.5 0 Although the courts
could still demand full contract payments outside the plan as
a condition of continuing the stay, it would be entirely consistent with the automatic stay rule to shift judicial attention away
from contract modification and to focus primarily upon the equities.5 1 In other words, the fact that the debtor proposed to
pay the secured creditor outside the plan at less than the contract
52
rate would not necessarily force the lifting of the stay.
If this approach were followed in the hypothetical, the
court's discretion concerning the stay would be conditioned on
all factors, rather than solely upon compliance with the payment
provisions in the contract. The court would first note that the
car was necessary for the successful operation of the plan. Then,
by requiring adequate insurance, the court would negate impairment of the creditor's interest. By also finding that the creditor's
interest would not be materially or adversely affected by the
delay in payment, the court's discretion in refusing to lift the
stay would be properly exercised. In light of the new Rules,
it seems reasonable to expect that the "no modification" position
will be reevaluated and that the courts which formulated it will
adopt a position more in line with the social, economic and
humanitarian relief envisioned by Congress in the enactment of
Chapter XIII.
The final approach which the courts have taken is to allow
the debtor to modify the payment provisions of the secured creditor's contract when necessary to preserve the plan. This position
is apparently founded upon the premise that it is far more equitable to subject a creditor to a slight delay in payment rather
than destroy a plan and possibly a debtor. 53 These courts have
achieved their goal procedurally by construing the phrase "dealt
with" as being synonymous with the term "affected."5 4 This
construction allows the court to make use of section 607 of the
49. See note 9 supra.
50. Rule 13-401. Prior to the adoption of the Rules, such stays were
within the power of the court, but were not automatic. See note 22
supra.
51. This focus on equities is the essential factor in the reasoning of
those courts which do permit slight modification of secured creditor payment rights under the contract. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text
infra.
52. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra.
53. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 475 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1973).

54. See, e.g., In re Wilder, 225 F. Supp. 67 (M.D. Ga. 1963).

See also

Countryman, Chapter XIII Wage Earners' Plans: Past, Present and
Future, 18 CATH.U.L. Rsv. 275 (1969).
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Bankruptcy Act which states that "[a] creditor shall be deemed
to be affected by a plan only if his interest shall be materially
and adversely affected thereby."5 5 By its terms, this language
would permit a debtor to submit a plan providing for modification of a secured creditor's payment rights under his contract
and have the plan confirmed over objection, so long as the creditor's interest was not "materially and adversely affected." So
far only one court has expressly held that the plan itself can
provide for contractual modification and still be confirmed over
objections.5" Other courts have allowed contractual modification, but the result has been achieved through the use of the
court's injunctive power.
In the case of In re Pizzolato,17 a conditional automobile
sales contract provided for sixteen monthly payments of $70 with
a seventeenth and final balloon payment of $435. The wage
earner plan proposed a continuance of the $70 monthly installments until the full amount of the note had been paid off, but
made no provision for the final balloon payment. The secured
creditor rejected the plan and appealed a subsequent order
enjoining reclamation of the vehicle.5
The district court in Pizzolato, in sustaining the plan and
denying the appeal of the secured creditor, made an extremely
important ruling. It held that "dealing with" a secured creditor
and the exercise of the court's injunctive power to prevent the
creditor's foreclosure on the security, though related propositions,
were not inseparable. It acknowledged that a secured creditor
was "dealt with" if given less than full contractual payments
under the plan, but nevertheless ruled that the injunction preventing reclamation was proper and should be upheld. The court
decreed that an injunction should issue against a secured creditor
"when in the sound discretion of the court, such an injunction is
necessary, to meet the ends of equity and justice."' 9 The factors
considered relevant in upholding the exercise of sound discretion
were the debtor's substantial equity in the collateral, the "essential" relation of the collateral to the success and preservation of
the rehabilitative plan, the "highly unlikely" probability that the
security would be impaired, 0 and the fact that payments to the
55. Bankruptcy Act § 607 (1973) states in its entirety:

A creditor shall be deemed to be 'affected' by a plan only if his

interest shall be materially and adversely affected thereby. In the
event of controversy, the court shall, after hearing upon notice,
summarily determine whether any creditor is so affected.
56. In re Teegarden, 330 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Kan. 1971).
57.
58.
59.
60.

268 F.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

Supp. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
354.
356.
357. Impairment of the security was considered "highly
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secured creditor would not be "seriously" delayed."'
In allowing and enforcing the contractual modification over
the secured creditor's objection, the court was apparently influenced by the equitable realization that reclamation would have
the effect of destroying the plan and forcing the debtor into
straight bankruptcy. The detrimental consequences of such an
event would not be suffered by the debtor alone but would affect
other secured and unsecured creditors as well, causing them to
recover significantly less on their claims. Given these considerations, it was decided that although the dissenting secured creditor's contract was technically "dealt with," his claim was not
"materially and adversely affected" by the plan and it could be
2
confirmed without his acceptance.
The rationale of this line of cases is that a secured creditor
is not "dealt with" by a plan unless it either limits the total
amount he may recover or impairs his security interest. These
cases stress that equitable considerations may dictate that a
creditor technically but not substantively "dealt with" may be
enjoined from enforcing his security interest if reclamation
would destroy the plan.
The same result will occur under the new Rules when the
court refuses to lift the automatic stay. Rather than treating
any restriction upon contract rights as impairing the security
interest, contractual modifications will be granted providing they
neither seriously impair the creditor's right to realize the value
of his collateral nor his right to reclaim in the event of default
of scheduled payments under the plan. By following this reasoning, the wage earner plan becomes available to many debtors who
otherwise would be precluded from enjoying its benefits. By
focusing upon the goal to be achieved rather than the statutory
language, these courts have succeeded in implementing the congressional intent by providing a viable alternative to straight
bankruptcy.
THE PARTIALLY SECURED CREDITOR IN CHAPTER XIII

Another important aspect of Chapter XIII proceedings is the
extent to which any creditor shall be deemed secured. The Chapter XIII Rules provide that the bankruptcy judge must value
the collateral held by a creditor in order to determine the extent
unlikely" because the vehicle's value was much higher than the
amount owed on the note.
61. Id. The extension of seven or eight months occasioned by the
failure to make the "balloon payment" on the specified contract date
was not felt to be a serious delay in payment.

62. Id.
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to which he shall be deemed secured. 3 This rule is merely an
application of the general bankruptcy requirement that in order
to achieve a fair and equitable distribution of the bankrupt's
assets a secured creditor may participate in the general distribution of assets only for the deficiency remaining after deducting
4
the value of the security.
Any creditor whose claim exceeds the value of his security
interest is said to be partially secured. The partially secured
creditor is deemed to have two claims, one secured and the other
unsecured.6 5 A number of interesting results flow from this
determination. First, the debtor's plan must provide for the payment of the unsecured portion together with all other unsecured
claims as a prerequisite to confirmation," but the secured claim
63. Rule 13-307(d):
If a secured creditor files a claim, the value of the security interest
held by him as collateral for his claim shall be determined by the
court. The claim shall be allowed as a secured claim to the extent
of the value so determined and as an unsecured claim to the extent
it is enforceable for any excess of the claim over such value. For
the purposes of this subdivision the court may appoint an appraiser
in the manner specified by and subject to the limitations of Bankruptcy Rule 606.
As stated in note 9 supra, no Rule may "abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right" set forth in the 'Bankruptcy Act. A recent decision
has held that Rule 13-307 (d) is invalid. In re Herman Moralez, 1 Bankr_
Ct. Dec. 1210 (N.D. Cal. 1975). This case reasoned that Rule 13-307(d)
constituted a modification of a substantive right guaranteed in the Act,
rendering the Rule void.
64. Bankruptcy Act § 57h. This principle, termed the bankruptcy
rule of distribution, differs from the so-called equity rule which would
allow a creditor to participate with his entire claim, keeping his security
57,20
in reserve to cover any deficiency. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY,
(14th ed. 1974).
65. Rule 13-202(c) provides:
A creditor whose claim has been allowed in part as a secured claim
and in part as an unsecured claim shall be entitled to accept or
reject a plan in both capacities unless his secured claim is not dealt
with by the plan, in which event he shall be entitled to accept or
reject only as an unsecured creditor.
The Bankruptcy Rules Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 13-202(c)
states:
Rule 13-307(d) provides that a claim which is only partially secured
is to be allowed in part as secured claim and in part as an unsecured claim. If the plan deals with his secured claim, subdivision
(c) allows the holder of such a claim to vote in both capacities. If
the plan does not deal with his secured claim he is, of course, entitled to vote only as an unsecured creditor. In either event, only
the amount of his unsecured claim should be counted in determining
whether the plan has been accepted by a majority in amount of
unsecured claims within the meaning of § 652 (1) of the Act.
66. Prior to the adoption of the Chapter XIII Rules, a bankruptcy
referee stated:
Section 646(1) of the Bankruptcy Act requires that all unsecured creditors must be dealt with generally. Any favored treatment jeopardizes the plan since section 656(a) (1) requires that
there must be compliance with the provisions of this chapter as a
condition to confirmation. Payment of a partially secured claim in
accordance with the terms of the contract clearly constitutes favored
treatment vis-a-vis other unsecured creditors. Most importantly,
section 656 (a) (2) requires that the provisions of the plan must be
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may or may not be dealt with in the plan at the debtor's
option, 67 and the rights of the creditor as to that claim will be
determined in accordance with the previous discussion on secured
creditors. Second, since the unsecured claim will be provided
for, the creditor will have a vote in the acceptance or rejection
of the plan in the capacity of a general, unsecured creditor. 6
Similarly, if the plan provides for the secured claim, the creditor
will have a vote in that capacity as well.6 9 In either event, only
the amount of the unsecured claim will be counted in determining whether the plan has been accepted by a majority in amount
of unsecured claims for purposes of confirmation. 70 Third, since
a plan may provide for priority of payment as between the
secured and unsecured debts affected by the plan, 71 the partially secured creditor will be limited to the value of his security
72
interest in the amount of priority payments he may receive.
The above provisions of Chapter XIII represent a basic
premise of American bankruptcy law in that a fair and equitable
distribution will be effected by treating all creditors within the
same class on a parity.73 The creditor gets exactly what he bargained for when he entered into the security agreement with the
debtor. He stands in the favored role of the secured creditor
to the extent that he protected himself, and therefore is guaranin the best "interests" of the creditors ....

On either ground,

therefore, a plan providing for contract payments to partially

secured creditors properly should not be confirmed.

Poulos, The Secured Creditor in Wage Earner Proceedings: Dream
Versus Reality, 44 RE. J. 68, 76 (1970).
67. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
68. See note 65 supra.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Bankruptcy Act § 646(3) (1973) states:
A plan under this chapter- . . . (3) may provide for priority of
payment during the period of extension as between the secured and
unsecured debts affected by the plan.
72. Some interesting problems may arise in this area if the debtor
is unable to complete his plan and converts to bankruptcy under Rule
13-215. For example, assume that a partially secured creditor has a
claim of $1,000, which is secured to the extent of $500, and demands
priority as to that portion. Debtor pays $500 to the creditor and then
converts to bankruptcy. What is the creditor's status in the bankruptcy
proceedings: secured, partially secured, or unsecured? Since he took
priority payments on his security, he will probably be deemed to have
received payment to the value of his security, and therefore will have a
$500 unsecured claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. However, if the
creditor had not demanded priority and had merely been paid pro rata
with all other creditors in the Chapter XIII proceeding, he will be
deemed to still be secured and the lien will have been preserved. Upon
conversion to bankruptcy, if the debtor had few assets (as is usually the
case), the creditor who demanded priority will have received $500 and
will take a pro rata share of the remaining assets, whereas the debtor
who did not take priority payments will have received $500 and will be
entitled to his security worth $500, thus receiving full payments of his
claim.
73. United States National Bank v. Chase National Bank, 331 U.S.
28, 34 (1947).
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teed either full payment to the value of the collateral, or the
exercise of his security rights under the Uniform Commercial
Code.
The provisions requiring valuation of security came into
effect in 1973 as part of the Chapter XIII Rules. The need to
codify this area of procedure was deemed imperative, since no
reported Chapter XIII case had ever differentiated between
secured and partially secured creditors.74 Indeed, in the only case
ever addressing the problem, the court ruled that partially
secured creditors were to be treated as those fully secured. 75 The
vast majority of courts apparently failed to recognize that a
problem existed.7 6 Regardless of the value of any security held
by a creditor, he was referred to as a "secured creditor" and was
permitted to enjoy all the benefits flowing from that designation.7 7 When this is coupled with the fact that the majority of
courts accord full contract payments to "secured creditors," the
inequitable results of many cases are understandable.
Courts following the O'Dell line of reasoning placed the
partially secured creditor in a strong bargaining position since
he was permitted to prevent adoption of a proposed plan by his
single dissent. By threatening to exercise his veto power, the
partially secured creditor could demand that the plan provide
for his payment in full according to the terms of his contract
as a condition to his acceptance of the plan. However, if the
partially secured creditor were to be paid in full, according to
the terms of his contract, there may be insufficient funds available to pay general creditors. In such cases, the unsecured creditors would probably reject the plan because after the debtor had
made payments to his secured and partially secured creditors in
full, the money available for proportional distribution among
unsecured creditors would be too little to justify bookkeeping
and collection costs. If the "no modification" line of reasoning
were followed, and the terms of the partially secured creditor
were not met, he would be permitted to reclaim possibly vital
collateral which could frustrate the plan.
Such results were manifestly inequitable when the value of
the partially secured creditor's security interest was disproportionately small in relation to the debt owed him. The partially
74. See generally Comment, The Partially Secured Creditor Under
ChapterXIII of the Bankruptcy Act, 3 PRosPEcrus 285 (1970); Comment,
Debtors Dilemma: Status of the Secured Creditor Under Chapter XIII
of the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U.C.D.L. REV. 277 (1971).

75. In re Worley, CCH Bankr. L. Rep.

64, 283 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd.

sub nom, Worley v. Budget Credit, Inc., CCH Bankr. L. Rep.

(6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 407 (1972).

76. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
77. Id.

64, 285
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secured creditor was given significantly greater control over the
debtor's property than was warranted by his security interest.
Moreover, the objectives of fairness and equity which underlie
the entire Bankruptcy Act were being thwarted, and the specific objective of Chapter XIII of providing a means of relief and
rehabilitation to the wage earner debtor was being defeated.
PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACTS

Two proposed comprehensive Bankruptcy Acts are now
before Congress. 78 From the standpoint of the Chapter XIII
debtor and his secured creditors, however, no sweeping changes
are contemplated. Rather, the proposed Acts attempt to codify
the present case law which is most conducive to debtor rehabilitation, while retaining many of the current statutory provisions
and Rules of Chapter XIII which promote that end.
Under the proposed Bankruptcy Acts, the debtor will offer
a plan calling for a composition or extension of indebtedness,
or for a composition of some and an extension of other indebtedness. 78 The debtor will be required to submit a plan which
includes provisions dealing with unsecured claims generally.
The plan, however, may alter or modify the rights of the holders
of such claims in the same manner as is presently allowed.8 0
The debtor may also include in his plan provisions dealing
with claims secured by personal property severally.8 ' This section retains the permissive language contained in Chapter XIII
and allows the debtor to provide for all, some or none of his
secured creditors within his plan. The proposed Acts would also
permit the debtor's plan to provide for the curing of defaults
within a reasonable time and otherwise modify the rights of the
holders of such claims.82 Furthermore, the court is required to
confirm the debtor's plan if it "provides for the preservation to
each secured creditor affected by the plan of the value of his
claim against the property of the debtor ....
,,83 Under these sections, the contract rights of any secured party may be modified so
long as the creditor's interest in the security is not impaired. In
other words, a creditor will not be deemed "affected" by a plan
78. The two bills are the Bankruptcy Commission Bill (H.R. 10792
and S. 2565, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reintroduced as H.R. 31 and S.

236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)) and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges Bill (H.R. 16643 and S. 4046, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974),
reintroduced as H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)).
79. Bankruptcy Commission Bill Sec. 6-201; National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges Bill Chapter VI, Part 3.

80. See note 79 supra.

81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).

83. Bankruptcy Commission Bill Sec. 6-204(b); National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges Bill Chapter VI, Part 3.
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unless he is somehow precluded from realizing at least the value
of his general interest in the debtor's property.
The adoption of either of the new Acts would satisfactorily
solve the secured creditor problem and should make the use of
wage earner plans much more attractive and workable by allowing debtors to extend the rate of payment to all creditors. Under both Acts creditors are guaranteed exactly what they bargained for, losing only the power to arbitrarily veto plans which
many courts have held exists under the present law. In short,
the two proposed Bankruptcy Acts offer a substantial restatement and clarification of the fundamental principles which
underlie Chapter XIII.
CONCLUSION

The conflicting opinions concerning the rights of secured
creditors are indicative of the uncertainty which presently reigns
in the courts regarding the judicial function in Chapter XIII proceedings. Are the courts to give priority to secured creditors
or to the wage earner's plan? The solution to this problem may
be found in three interconnected principles at work in all Chapter XIII cases involving non-assenting secured creditors. First,
the courts must recognize that impairment of contract rights is
the essence of our bankruptcy system,84 and that the extension
of payment concept incorporates this principle into Chapter XIII
proceedings. Second, the mandate of the due process clause of
the Constitution compels preservation of the secured creditors'
interest or property rights. Thus, the courts must guarantee
such creditors payment to the value of their security, and at a
rate sufficient to cover the depreciation on the collateral. 85
Third, since Congress clearly intended that wage earner plans
should succeed whenever feasible, the courts have an obligation
to implement this purpose.
In construing these principles together, it becomes readily
apparent that the courts should implement all wage earner plans
which properly preserve a dissenting secured creditor's interest
in his collateral. Creditors should not be deemed "dealt with"
by a plan, nor should the automatic stay be lifted, unless the
court determines that the secured creditor's interest is impaired.
Many courts, however, have failed to apply these fundamental principles. They appear preoccupied with interpreting
the statutory language of Chapter XIII without capturing or
heeding the spirit underlying the Chapter's creation. By focus84. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).

85. Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440 (1937); cf. Seidman, The
Plight of the Secured Creditors in Chapter XI, 80 COM. L.J. 343 (1975).
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ing upon phrases such as "dealt with" and "affected by" rather
than viewing the problem in terms of protected property rights
and modifiable contract rights, these courts often thwarted the
congressional purpose in passing Chapter XIIr and denied its envisioned relief.
The judiciary, however, is not entirely to blame. When
courts must work within the confines of poorly drafted statutory
material, conflicts are inevitable. The judicial variance in the
interpretation and application of the statutory scheme dealing
with the secured creditor indicates the appropriateness of a legislative solution. Of all the Chapter XIII provisions, none is in
more urgent need of reform and clarification than those delineating and defining the role of the secured creditor.
David Schwartz

